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RESPONDING TO ETHNIC AND
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN THE
EMERGING ARAB ORDER:
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF RIGHTS
Omar M. Dajani*

ABSTRACT

Intercommunal conflict has marred the politicaltransitions unfolding in
a number of states in the Middle East, raisingquestions about the status and
protection of ethnic and religious minorities in the region's evolving
political order. In view of the transnationalcharacterand regional scale of
the problem, this Article considers the efficacy of one potential regional
response-the development of an Arab convention on minority rights. The
Article begins by describing three types of "minority problems" that have
been sources of conflict in the Middle East: (1) religious minorities and
Islamist majoritarianism;(2) nationalistminorities and territorialdisputes,
and (3) politically dominant minorities and survivalistminoritarianism. The
Article then sketches the international legal context, focusing in particular
on the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on National Minorities.
Turning back to the Middle East, the Article concludes that while a treaty
exercise of that kind is probably premature, an effort to begin building
consensus about regional norms would be a valuable means of promoting
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. The author thanks
Peter Bartu, Mina Girgis, and participants in the Yale Law School Middle East Legal Studies
Seminar for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the
excellent research assistance provided by Ahmed Ali.
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discourse about the contours of local norms and their harmonization-both
with one anotherand with evolving internationalhuman rights standards.
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INTRODUCTION

In October 2011, one week after the Egyptian army killed more than
two dozen unarmed Coptic protestors in front of the Maspero State
Television and Radio Building in Cairo, New York Times columnist Ross
Douthat reminded his readers that the Copts of Egypt are among the oldest
Christian communities on earth; he then added, ominously, "[b]ut they may
not survive the Arab Spring."' Douthat went on to suggest that the Maspero
incident was "a familiar story in the Middle East, where any sort of popular
sovereignty has tended to unleash the furies and drive minorities into exile." 2
Observing that minorities in the Arab world were not alone in becoming the
"collateral damage" of democratization, he submitted that "the causes of
democracy and international peace have often been intimately tied to ethnic
cleansing: both have gained ground not in spite of mass migrations and mass
1 Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Democracy's Collateral Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/opinion/sunday/douthat-democracys-collateraldamage.html.
2 id.
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murders, but because of them.", 3 And, while Douthat acknowledged that "[a]
democratic Middle East would be a remarkable triumph for humanity,"
he
4
asked, "is it worth decades of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing?"
Douthat's account--of ballot box as Pandora's box and popular
sovereignty as mob rule-is not without historical support. 5 But it breezes
over the range of factors that have been found to inflame group tensions
during political transitions, including intervention by foreign powers,
economic inequality, dysfunctional governmental institutions, geopolitical
rivalries, and the manipulation of identity politics by opportunistic leaders.6
Moreover, the choice that Douthat sets out for the Middle East-between
authoritarianism and ethno-religious violence--offers policymakers precious
few options for responding to the transformations in the region. Attempting
to put the genie back into the bottle by undertaking to reverse or prevent
further political transitions is likely to be as ineffective as it is unpalatable.
Indeed, transitions that stall before democracy is achieved are especially
likely to lead to international war.7 The critical question, then, is not
whether democratization spurs violent intercommunal conflict but, instead,
what can be done to halt and prevent such conflict as transitions of varying
character and uneven pace unfold across the Middle East.
It remains far from clear what kinds of systems states in transition will
put in place to manage diversity within their borders-how they will
distribute decision-making between central and regional governments, which
communal and individual rights they will extend to ethnic and religious
minorities, and what kinds of mechanisms they will establish to protect
minority groups from majoritarian abuse? Questions of constitutional design
are already a focus of considerable attention and debate. 8 However, in view
3

id.

4

id.

5 As noted in a recent overview of the social science literature, "the link between

democratization and civil war has been substantiated empirically." Judith Vorrath & Lutz F.
Krebs, Democratization and Conflict in Ethnically Divided Societies, I LIVING REVS. IN
DEMOCRACY 1,6 (2009), available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2009-1.
6 See id. at 1-8.
7 See EDWARD D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES GO TO WAR 70-71 (Kindle ed. 2005).
8 See, e.g., Marc Lynch, The Battle for Egypt's Constitution, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 11,
2013),
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/1 1/thebattlefor.egyptsconstitution;
Egypt and Tunisia: New Constitutions Take Shape, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2012), available

at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21565268-revolutionaries-argueover-how-they-will-rule-and-what-rights-give-citizens-new;
Constitution
Controversy,
FOREIGN
POL'Y

Duncan
(Sept.

Pickard,
5,

Libya's
2012),
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of the regional scale of the transformations in progress and the transnational
character of identity politics in the Middle East, it is also worth considering
what steps can and should be taken at the regional level to address
intercommunal conflict. Can regional mechanisms or institutions play a role
in reducing conflict (or, at least, reducing the stakes of conflict) between
ethnic or religious groups within states? Can an institution like the League
of Arab States be transformed from the talk-shop for autocratic heads of
state it was for decades into a forum through which the diverse peoples of
the region can be protected and represented?
On what normative
foundations might an enterprise of that kind be built?
This Article focuses on the last of these questions, considering in
particular whether the states of the Middle East should aim to develop a
convention on the status and protection of minorities of the kind adopted
more than a decade ago by the Council of Europe. 9 Part I offers some
factual context, describing three types of "minority problems"' ° that have
been potent sources of conflict in the region: (1) religious minorities and
Islamist majoritarianism; (2) nationalist minorities and territorial disputes;
and (3) politically dominant minorities and survivalist minoritarianism.
These three dynamics, I submit, highlight not only the need for concerted
regional action to prevent intercommunal conflict but also some of the
challenges likely to attend such an effort. Part II sketches the international
legal context. While states long ago recognized that intercommunal conflict
within their borders had the potential to lead to transnational conflict across
them, international law reflects continuing differences among states about
how to prevent tensions between ethnic and religious groups from erupting
into threats to international peace. In Europe, whose experience has had an
outsized influence on the development of this area of international law,"
regional institutions have undertaken to prevent conflict by erecting a
normative framework for minority protection around the twin pillars of
individual rights and an expansive conception of freedom of association,
while reserving to states broad latitude for developing domestic strategies for

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/05/libyas-constitution-controversy.
9 See Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities pmbl., Feb. 1, 1995,
E.T.S. No. 157 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
10 For a discussion of some of the problems with the expression "minority problems," see
Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1299 (1982).
1 See Li-ann Thio, Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches Toward Minority
Protection Beyond Europe, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 409, 410 (2002) (describing European
influence on development of international minority protection norms).

Respondin2 to Ethnic and Religious Conflict

33

managing diversity. Part III considers whether a similar regional effort
should be undertaken in the Middle East with a view toward building
consensus about norms pertaining to the status and protection of minorities.
I submit that such an effort would be valuable, particularly in view of the
need for greater development of local norms and for their harmonization
with one another and with established international human rights standards.
I submit, however, that a treaty exercise is premature and is unlikely to yield
results on the ground unless it is complemented by a broader effort to
address the political and strategic dynamics that make states reluctant to
commit to the protection of sub-national groups and that undermine the
credibility of commitments that they do make.
I.

DYNAMICS OF INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE
EAST

The euphoria that accompanied the first months of the Arab Spring has
been tempered by concerns about the eruption of intercommunal conflict in a
number of states and, more broadly, about the status and protection of ethnic
and religious minorities in the region's evolving political order. 12 The civil
war in Syria has taken on increasingly sectarian dimensions,1 3 stoking fears
that the fall of the Asad regime will lead to reprisals against Alawis and
institutionalized discrimination against Christians, 14 as well as increasing
Kurdish irredentism.15 The war has already invited the involvement of
neighbors, 16 and its increasingly transnational character raises concerns that
the conflict will not only escalate further but also spread to neighboring
Lebanon and Iraq, unsettling power-sharing arrangements in those sharply
12 For an especially thoughtful, if pessimistic, assessment of recent developments, see
Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, This Is Not a Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/nov/08/not-revolution.
13 See Lindsay Gifford, Syria's Tangled Roots of Resentment, SADA (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://camegieendowment.org/sada/2012/10/1 1/syria-s-tangled-roots-of-resentment/e0i 1.

14 See id.; see also Charles Glass, Syria: The Citadel & the War, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (June
7, 2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/syria-citadel-

war/ (describing fears of Syria's Christian communities).
15 See Ofra Bengio, Op-Ed., Kurdistan Reaches Toward the Sea, HA'ARETZ (Aug. 3, 2012),

http ://www.haaretz.com/weekend/weekend-opinions/kurdistan-reaches-toward-the-sea1.455675.
16 David Hearst, Op-Ed., Syria and the Battle for Regional Control, THE GUARDIAN (Oct.
16,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/16/syria-battle-regionalcontrol; Tim Arango, Syrian War's Spillover Threatens a Fragile Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24,

2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/world/middleeast/iraq-faces-new-perils-fromsyrias-civil-war.html.
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divided states. 17 Over the last two years, tensions between Sunni and Shi'i
communities have also grown more acute in the states of the Gulf, bolstered
by the sectarian violence elsewhere and by the brutal suppression of
budding, largely Shi'i protest movements by the Sunni regimes in Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia. 18 Libya's Tawerghan population has suffered abuse and
forced resettlement as collective punishment for their support for the
Gaddafi regime, 19 and the country's Amazigh population continues to
struggle for political and linguistic rights, notwithstanding their opposition to
the Gaddafi regime.20 In Egypt, moreover, Copts have expressed alarm
about their marginalization from a revolution that initially embraced them as
equal partners but has become increasingly embedded in a broader
Islamizing trend, fearing that they will become more vulnerable to attacks
and discrimination by both state and non-state actors.2 1
The transnational dimensions of these problems point to the need for
concerted regional action to address them. Such action, however, must be
informed by an appreciation of the varying ways in which ethnic or religious
difference has become a point of tension. With that end in mind, sketched
below are three types of minority problems that have proved to be significant
sources of conflict in the Middle East.
a. Religious Minorities andIslamist Majoritarianism
Democratization in the Middle East has become increasingly
intertwined with Islamization. The electoral success of Islamist movements
in a number of states has prompted them "to embrace democratic
mechanisms and politics more generally with wholehearted enthusiasm" and
to show "increasingly detailed interest in and commitment to strengthening

17 See Agha & Malley, supra note 12.
18 See

CHATHAM

HOUSE,

KUWAIT

STUDY

GROUP:

IDENTITY,

CITIZENSHIP,

AND

(2012),
2-6
GCC
THE
IN
SECTARIANISM
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/183415; Toby Matthiesen; Saudi
2012),
10,
(July
POL'Y
FOREIGN
Escalation,
Shiite
Arabia's
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/10/sable-rattlingin-the-gulf.
19 See Doreen Khoury, Middle East and North Africa, in STATE OF THE WORLD'S
MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2012, at 193, 205 (Minority Rts. Group ed., 2012); Kim
Sengupta, The Persecutionof Tawerghans: Libya's Heavy Pricefor Freedom, URUKNET.INFO
(July 18, 2012), http://www.uruknet.info/?p=89672.
20 See Khoury, supra note 19, at 206.
21 See Sarah El Deeb, Thousands March to Mark Killing of Egypt Copts, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct.
unresolved.

9,

2012),

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/rights-group-killings-egypts-copts-
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majoritarian mechanisms., 22 Their success, however, has been greeted with
apprehension by both secular elites 23 and members of religious minorities,
whose concerns about the consequences of Islamist majoritarianism have
yielded ambivalence in some quarters about the merits of democratization
itself.24 What is perceived to be at stake is not only the extent to which new
regimes will tolerate and have the capacity to prevent violations of
individual and communal rights, but also how those rights will be defined in
a political order dominated by an Islamist majority.
The predicament of Egypt's Copts exemplifies this dynamic.
Numbering between five and eighteen million-their population itself a
point of contention 25 -Copts have occupied "a paradoxical place in the

Egyptian national imagination" since well before the revolution of January
25, 201 1.26 As individuals and as a community, Copts have long faced de
jure and de facto discrimination in Egypt, particularly with respect to
participation and employment in the public sector and the issuance of
building permits for churches.27 In addition, as intercommunal violence has
surged in Upper Egypt since the 1980s, attacks on Copts have often gone
unpunished.28

Copts have responded to this predicament in divergent ways. Even as
some pressed for more pointed criticism of the Mubarak regime's human
22

Nathan J. Brown, Changes in the Domestic Order, in

THE EMERGING ORDER IN THE

MIDDLE EAST, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, POL'Y OUTLOOK 2, 4

2012), http://camegieendowment.org/files/middle-east orderl.pdf.
23 See Marina Ottaway, The Consequences of the Internal Power Shift, in
ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 22, at 6.
24

See Charles Glass, Syria: The Citadel & the War, N.Y.

REV. BOOKS

(May

THE EMERGING

(June 7, 2012),

available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/syria-citadel-war/; Said
Shehata, Copts Between Shafiq & Morsi: An Easy Choice, AHRAM ONLINE (June 12, 2012),

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/4/0/44639/Opinion/Copts-between-Shafiq-andMorsi-an-easy-choice.aspx.
25 Disputes regarding the size of Egypt's Coptic population are longstanding. See Paul
Sedra, Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern
Egyptian Politics, 10 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 219, 233 n.1 (1999). Egypt's official
statistics agency's recently estimated the Coptic population to be 5.13 million, a figure
disputed by the Coptic Church, which estimates the population to be 15 to 18 million. See
Egyptian Copts Reject Population Estimate, AHRAM ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/53839/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-Copts-rejectpopulation-estimate.aspx.
26 Avi Ascher-Shapiro, Egypt's Copts Face an Uncertain Political Future, MUFrAH (May
21, 2012), http://muftah.org/egyptE2%80%99s-copts-face-uncertain-political-future/.
27 See Sedra, supra note 25, at 222.
28 Id. at231.
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rights record and sought recognition and protection of the community as a
minority,2 9 the Coptic Orthodox Church for many years staked out an
accommodation with the regime. On the one hand, the Church "embrace[d]
the rhetoric of national unity, ' ,30 rejecting the characterization of Copts as a
minority and emphasizing their place as "part and parcel of the Egyptian
nation." 31 On the other hand, it maintained a clientelist relationship with the
regime that has been aptly labeled a "millet partnership. 3 2 Pursuant to this
arrangement, the regime rewarded the Patriarch's cooperation and loyalty
with resources, such as church construction permits and political
appointments, and the Patriarch used these resources to consolidate his
authority within the community.33 The regime, for its part, attempted
alternately to present itself as the Copts' best protection against the dual
threats of chaos and Islamism 34 and to distance itself from them in an effort
to avoid appearing to be in the thrall of Christian-and, by implication,
Western-interests.3 5
The Egyptian revolution has altered these dynamics in complex-and,
Although the Coptic Orthodox
to some extent, contradictory-ways.
Church urged its members not to get involved in the demonstrations that
brought down the Mubarak regime,36 the protests drew many Copts to Tahrir
Square, uniting Muslims and Christians in a euphoric moment that seemed to
herald "the end of sectarianism in Egypt." 37 That perception of unity,
however, proved short-lived. The government's failure to protect Copts
from subsequent attacks by thugs, soldiers, and Islamist hardliners, or to
prosecute their perpetrators, has been a major source of Coptic disaffection
with the revolution. 38
A number of other developments have also raised concerns among
Copts and others about Islamist majoritarianism in post-revolutionary Egypt:

29 Id. at 231-32.

Id. at 227.
31 Karim EI-Gawhary, Copts in the "Egyptian Fabric," 200 MIDDLE E. REP. 21,21 (1996).
32 Sedra, supra note 25, at 227.
31 See id. at 227-28.
34 See Yasmine Fathi, Egypt's Copts: A Cry of Pain, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/24107/Egypt/0/Egypts-Copts-A-cry-ofpain.aspx.
35 El-Gawhary,supra note 31, at 22.
36 Ascher-Shapiro,supra note 26.
37 Mariz Tadros, Sectarianism and its Discontents in Post-MubarakEgypt, 259 MIDDLE E.
30

REP. 26, 27 (2011).
38

See El Deeb, supranote 21.
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the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition to a 2011 draft law on the construction
of religious buildings that would have applied the same rules to churches as
to mosques;3 9 its decision to field a candidate in the 2012 presidential
elections, despite previous assurances that it would not; 40 the broad public
support for the constitutionalization of a law penalizing blasphemy that has
been enforced primarily against religious minorities; 4' disputes about the
extent to which Islamic law permits non-Muslims to vie for leadership
positions in the Egyptian state; 42 Islamist domination of the constituent
assembly that drafted Egypt's new constitution; 43 and, perhaps most of all,
the role assigned to shari'a in the constitution passed by referendum on
December 26, 2012. 44 With respect to the constitutionalization of shari 'a,
what has elicited the most pointed opposition is not a clause that provides
that the "[p]rinciples of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of
legislation," 45 which was borrowed from the 1971 constitution. Instead, it is
two new clauses, the first stating that scholars at Al Azhar "are to be
consulted regarding matters pertaining to Islamic law ' 46 and the second
elaborating upon the meaning of "principles of Islamic Sharia., 47 Although
the substantive implications of these provisions are far from clear,48 critics
have expressed concern that they leave open the possibility that restrictive

39 Khoury, supra note 19, at 196.
40

Profile:

Egypt's

Muslim

Brotherhood,

BBC

(June

26,

2012),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12313405.
41 See Kristen Chick, After Film, Push Strengthens for Blasphemy Clause in Egypt's
Constitution,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
17,
2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0916/After-film-push-strengthens-forblasphemy-clause-in-Egypt-s-constitution.
42 See Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, supra note 40 (discussing disputes with
Muslim Brotherhood over whether non-Muslim can be president or prime minister).
43 See Egyptian Copts Abandon Constitution Talks, Say 'Pointless' to Take Part, AL
ARABIYA NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articies/2012/04/02/204746.htm.
44 See John Pontifex, Coptic Leaders Say Egypt's Constitution 'Prepares the Way for
Islamic
Caliphate,'
CATHOLICHERALD.CO.UK
(Jan.
7,
2013),
http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/01/07/coptic-leader-says-egypts-constitutionprepares-the-way-for-islamic-caliphate/.
45 CONSTITUTION
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC
EGYPT, art. 2, available at
http://muftah.org/english-translation-of-egypts-new-draft-constitution/.
46 Id. art. 4.
219.

41

Id.

48

For a nuanced analysis, see Clark Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Islam in Egypt's New

art.

Constitution,
FOREIGN
POL'Y
(Dec.
13,
2012),
available
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam-in-egyptsnew_constitution.

at
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interpretations of Islamic law will be imposed on Copts and other Egyptians.
One Coptic Catholic bishop worries that the constitution "paves the way for
an Islamic caliphate. 49
Against the backdrop of continuing political change in Egypt,. it is
difficult to ascertain how Copts will fare in the emerging legal order.
Nathan Brown points out that as Islamists have moved into government, they
"have accepted what they see as the burdens of leadership and have adopted
positions dictated more by economic and international exigencies than by
their interpretation of religious texts."50 Similarly, Andrew Klager predicts
that democratic competition will yield better protection for Egypt's religious
minorities:
[W]ith such a narrow margin of victory and a relatively low
percentage of supporters, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and
Justice Party is showing signs of awareness, accompanied by the
commensurate strategizing, that.., opposition groups supported by
the original student revolutionaries, youth movements, leftist,
liberals, and secular Muslims will have more time and motivation...
to coalesce as a united front against the Islamist option; this, no
doubt, means that the Freedom and Justice Party, and other Islamist
parties . . .will be forced to enshrine the protection of the Coptic

minority in practical ways to expropriate one of the policy priorities
that make secular liberals unique. 51
But though President Morsi initially stressed "that he would never allow
anyone to attack public or private property or terrorise any Egyptian citizen,"
and his government established local reconciliation committees to respond to
intercommunal strife,5 2 Copts worry that such committees will simply
entrench local power dynamics that favor Muslim majorities.53 Observing
that "[n]ational unity is strongest at times when citizenship is mediated by a
common Egyptian identity and weakest when citizenship is mediated by

49 Pontifex, supra note 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).

50 Brown, supra note 22, at 4.
51 Andrew Klager, New Political Climate Could Provide Hope for Copts, EGYPT INDEP.
(July 15, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/new-political-climate-couldprovide-hope-copts.
52 See Hatem Maher, Morsi Wants Sectarian Clashes Culprits Punished, Church Calls for
3,
2012),
Copts,
A-HRAM
ONLINE
(Aug.
End
to
Violence Against
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/49409/Egypt/Politics-/Morsi-wants-sectarianclashes-culprits-punished;-C.aspx.
53 See Tadros, supra note 37, at 31.

Respondinz to Ethnic and Relikious Conflict
religion," 54 Mariz Tadroz argues that "[w]hat is needed is the political will to
administer justice in compliance with universal rights, rather than power
hierarchies and normative values on the ground., 55 Moreover, after popular
antagonism to the Brotherhood exploded in breadth and ferocity in the
context of battles over the new constitution and presidential decrees in
December 2012, political observers expressed 5 6waning confidence in
Egyptian Islamists' political acumen and versatility.
As Egypt's new political order takes shape, it also remains to be seen to
what extent Copts will turn to the Coptic Orthodox Church either to mediate
between the government and the community or to manage the community's
"internal" affairs. The late Coptic Pope's refusal in 2011 to support an
international investigation of the Maspero incident seems to have been
driven by the fear that Copts would be seen as undermining Egyptian
national unity. 57

However, many Copts believe the late patriarch's non-

confrontational approach has been ineffective, and some have advocated that
the Church abandon a political role altogether.58 In addition, the Church's
conservative positions regarding a number of social issues, particularly
divorce, and its longstanding marginalization of middle class Copts from
Church governance have estranged some members, 59 with many embracing
the secular state as the best vehicle for protecting their rights. The Church
itself also refuses to accept Islamic law as a framework for protecting Coptic
rights. A senior bishop recently expressed concern that "Islamic Sharia law
does not grant non-Muslims their rights, and someone could interpret the
Sharia in such a way that it imposes special taxes or punishments., 60 At the
same time, the Church has resisted efforts by Copts to circumvent its
authority over matters of personal status through use of the secular court
system. 61

54 Id. at 27.
55

id.

See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 8.
57 Pope Shenouda Rejects InternationalInvestigation Into Maspero Violence,
56

EGYPT INDEP.

(Oct.
21,
2011),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/pope-shenouda-rejectsinternational-investigation-maspero-violence.
58 Safaa Abdoun, Political Role of Pope Shenouda Overshadows the Selection of His
Successor, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Mar. 27, 2012), newsegypt.com/2012/03/27/political-role-ofpope-shenouda-overshadows-the-selection-of-his-successor/.
59 See Sedra, supra note 25, at 228-33.
60 See Michael Adel, Living Through a Political Contradiction, AL AHRAM WKLY ONLINE
(Oct. 4-10, 2012), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1117/egI9.htm.
61 Emad EISaed & Amr Bayourni, Court Ruling on Coptic Intermarriage Overturned,
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As this brief discussion indicates, the cause of Coptic rights is riddled
with strategic dilemmas. What kinds of rights should be fought for? Is the
aim autonomy in addition to equality? How can the community's rights be
defined and safeguarded without sacrificing the liberties of individual
members? In the face of popular support for greater Islamization of law and
government, 62 is pressing for a secular public sphere the most effective
means of advancing the rights of religious minorities? To what extent, and
in what spheres, does Islamic law offer a viable alternative or
complementary framework for minority protection? And in a political
climate in which national and religious identity have grown increasingly
intertwined, how can religious minorities act to preserve their own
distinctiveness or to promote universal rights without inviting accusations
that they are subversive agents of foreign interests?
These dilemmas are not, of course, unique to the Copts of Egypt.
Christians in other Muslim-majority countries have grappled with similar
questions. In Syria, Christians have hesitated to throw in their lot with
opponents of the Asad regime, fearing that the regime's fall will augur the
end of Syria's secular state and further decline into chaos that will leave
them vulnerable to extremist elements.63 Christians in Iraq have already fled
in large numbers from urban areas-and, when possible, the country-in
response to intimidation and attacks, particularly after a 2010 massacre of
churchgoers in Baghdad by an al Qaeda affiliate.6 4 In addition, Palestinian
Christians complain about religious intimidation and the Islamization of
public spaces in Hamas-ruled Gaza, 65 even while emphasizing that Israel's
continuing military occupation of the Palestinian territories is the primary

(July 7, 2010), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/court-ruling-copticremarriage-overturned.
EGYPT INDEP.

62 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, MOST MUSLIMS
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DEMOCRACY, PERSONAL FREEDOMS, AND ISLAM IN POLITICAL LIFE 2 (2012), available at

http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedomsand-islam-in-political-life/.
63 See Glass, supra note 24, at 6.
64 See Jack Healy, Exodus from North Signals Iraqi Christians'Slow Decline, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/1l /world/middleeast/exodus-from-northsignals-iraqi-christians-decline.html?pagewanted=all; Anthony Shadid, Church Attack Seen
1,
2010),
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
at
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as
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 1/02/world/middleeast/02iraq.html?pagewanted=all.
65 See Phoebe Greenwood, Gaza Christians Long for Days Before Hamas Cancelled
Christmas, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/dec/23/gazachristians-hamas-cancelled-christmas.
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reason for Christian emigration from the area.6 6 Islamist majoritarianism,
moreover, presents even more pronounced risks to religious minorities
denied the status accorded to "Peoples of the Book" (ahl al Kitab) under
prevailing interpretations of Islamic law, such as Bahd'is, who face de jure
discrimination and persecution in Egypt and Iran.6 7
The region's political transformations also present strategic dilemmas to
minority Muslim sects and orders. Although the longstanding persecution,
discrimination, and economic marginalization suffered by Shi'a in Saudi
Arabia 68 has prompted renewed youth protests in the country's largely Shi'i
Eastern Province, 69 Shi'i leaders have tempered demands for political and
institutional reform, "conclud[ing] that their community's security is
intimately bound up with the survival of a regime that alone can mediate
between various and often competing groups while keeping the most
extreme elements at bay.",70 Similarly, attacks on Sufi shrines and religious
leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya by hardline Salafists have raised
questions about the capacity and inclination of new governments to protect
Sufis, who have aligned themselves with liberals or with religious
institutions opposed to the Islamist agenda. 71
In all of these contexts, what is at stake is not only states' protection of
the rights of religious minorities-rights to security, freedom of conscience,
and unencumbered religious practice-but also how governments will
engage with broader questions of national identity in an Islamizing political
order. As discussed in the next Part, questions of national identity loom
similarly large over disputes pertaining to the rights of nationalist minorities
in the region.
66 See Isabel Kershner, Palestinian Christians Look Back on a Year of Troubles, N.Y.
11,
2007),
TIMES
(Mar.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/1I/world/middleeast/11 christians.html?_r=0.
67 See Khoury, supra note 19, at 196-98.
68 See Madawi al-Rasheed & Loulouwa al-Rasheed, The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi
Policy Toward Tribal and Religious Opposition, 32 MIDDLE E.STUD. 96, 110 (1996).
69 Saudi Arabia: Shiite Protests Kill at Least 4, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/24/saudi-arabia-shiite-protests-n 1111 950.html.
70 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE SHIITE QUESTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 5 (2005),
at
http ://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iranavailable
gulf/saudi-arabia/045-the-shiite-question-in-saudi-arabia.aspx.
71

See JONATHAN BROWN, SALAFIS AND SUFIS IN EGYPT, THE CARNEGIE PAPERS (2011),

http://carnegieendowment.org/20 11/12/20/salafis-and-sufis-in-egypt/8kfk;
available at
Frederic Wehrey, Libya's Salafists in Search of Relevance, DAILY STAR (Sept. 14, 2012),
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b. NationalistMinoritiesand TerritorialDisputes
International borders in the Middle East were not, for the most part,
drawn with a view toward facilitating self-determination for the peoples of
the region. 72 The lack of alignment between the territorial boundaries of
states and the geographic distribution of ethnic and religious groups has
posed a challenge to nation building to which regimes have responded in a
range of ways. They have attempted to link national identity to more
longstanding or resonant frameworks of affiliation, such as Arabism 73 or
Islam,74 in the process excluding certain groups from the definition of
national community.7 5 They have undertaken to repress the expression of
alternative sources of identity through language76 or religious practice. 77
They have even attempted to eliminate competing identities by using ethnic
cleansing or genocide to increase homogeneity within their borders. 78 As

72

See generally DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN

EMPIRE AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 389-415

(1989).

73 For an insightful discussion of efforts by Arab states to harness and contain Arab
nationalism following independence see MICHAEL N. BARNETT, DIALOGUES IN ARAB POLITICS:
NEGOTIATIONS IN REGIONAL ORDER 61-68 (1998).
74 See, e.g., Adeed Dawisha, "Identity" and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq, 53
MIDDLE E. J. 553, 559-62 (1999) (describing previous Iraqi regime's opportunistic
appropriation of Islamic identity).
75 Groups that are Muslim but not Arab include Kurds, Berbers/Amazigh, Turkomans, and
Circassians. Groups that are Arab but not Muslim include Christian communities, such as
Copts, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Latins, and Protestants, as well as Baha'is. Groups that
are neither Arab nor Muslim include Armenians, Assyrians, and Southern Sudanese tribes.
See MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND DIASPORAS 8-9 (Moshe Ma'oz & Gabriel Sheffer eds.,
2009). Jews are sometimes considered part of the latter category.

See id. However, the

"ostensible binarism" between the categories of Arab and Jew is worthy of challenge. See
YEHOUDA A. SHENHAV, THE ARAB JEWS: A POSTCOLONIAL READING OF NATIONALISM,
RELIGION, AND ETHNICITY 14 (2006).
76 See, e.g., Paul Silverstein, Berbers in France and Algeria, 26 MIDDLE E. REP. (Fall
(describing
1996), available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer200berbers-france-algeria
suppression of Berber language by Boumedienne regime in Algeria).
77 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 70 at 6 (describing constraints on
Shi'i religious practice imposed by early Saudi state).
78 See generally Jennifer Jackson Preece, Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of NationState Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms, 20 HUM. RTS. QUART.
817, 820 (1998) (arguing that ethnic cleansing is outgrowth of political ideal of
"homogeneous nation-state"); see also TANER AKCAM, THE YOUNG TURKS' CRIME AGAINST
HUMANITY: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE OT7OMAN EMPIRE

(2012) (describing Ottoman plan to achieve ethnoreligious homogenization of Anatolia); Ilan
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described below, regimes in the Middle East have dealt particularly severely
with groups whose identities were perceived not only to be at odds with their
concept of the nation, but also to present a threat to the state's territorial
integrity or the regime's survival.
The situation of Kurds in Syria is a case in point. Spread primarily
across four modem states-Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-Kurds are
estimated to number approximately thirty million, making them the largest
ethno-linguistic group in the world without a state of their own. 79 Kurds are
predominantly Sunni Muslim; and though some have embraced the national
identity of the states where they reside,80 most do not consider themselves
ethnically Arab, Turk, or Persian. 8' Instead, Kurdish nationalists emphasize
both their distinctiveness and their rootedness to the land they call
Kurdistan:
The Kurds constitute a single nation [that] has occupied its present
habitat for at least three thousand years. They have outlived the rise
and fall of many imperial races: Assyrians, Persians, Greeks,
Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Turks. They have their own history,
language, and culture. Their country has been unjustly partitioned.
But they are the original owners, not strangers to be tolerated as
minorities with limited concessions granted at the whim of the
82
usurpers.
The "usurpers"-the regimes in Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and
Damascus-have responded both suspiciously and opportunistically to
Kurdish nationalism, harshly suppressing it within their own borders even
while providing assistance to Kurdish movements in rival states.83 And the
Zionist leaders embraced ethnic cleansing of Palestinians as means of creating geographic
space for Jewish nationalism).
79 J. Michael Kennedy, Kurds Remain on the Sideline of Syria's Uprising, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/middleeastikurds-remain-onsideline-in-syrias-uprising.html?pagewanted=all.
80 See, e.g., ROBERT LOWE, THE SYRIAN KURDS: A PEOPLE DISCOVERED, CHATHAM HOUSE

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAMME BRIEFING PAPER 06/01, at 2-3 (Jan. 2006), available at
www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108153 (noting that some Kurds in Syria

have embraced Arabic language and identity and achieved "positions of power or influence"
in the country).
81 See
Kurdistan
Kurdish
Conflict,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
82 C.J. Edmonds, Kurdish Nationalism, 6 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 87, 88 (1971).

83 For a broad survey of early state reactions to Kurdish nationalism, see generally id. at
91-107. For a discussion of more recent transnational dynamics, see LOWE, supra note 80, at
4-5; Zvi Bar'el, Iran is Eyeing a Strategic Partnershipwith the Kurds, HA'ARETZ (Aug. 1,
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Kurds, themselves, have been beset by disunity, 84 undermining their efforts
to secure respect for basic human rights within existing states, much less the
achievement of national self-determination.
The roughly 1.75 million Kurds in Syria constitute around 10% of
Syria's population 8 5-the highest concentration residing in the northeast
corner of the country.86 Kurds initially adapted well to Syrian independence,
but "as time went by, in an atmosphere of mounting pan-Arab exaltation,
[their] presence came more and more to be regarded as an offence and a
threat to be suppressed. 87 Until recently, Syria under Ba'ath rule has been
particularly inhospitable to Kurdish identity, the state discriminating against
Kurds "in every branch and in every activity of the administration" and
banning the possession of publications in the Kurmanji language. 88 Syria
has also taken a range of measures apparently calculated to stifle Kurdish
irredentism. In 1962, claiming that a large number of Kurds had infiltrated
Syria from Turkey, the government stripped Syrian citizenship from 120,000
Kurdish residents of the al-Hasaka province in Syrian Kurdistan, depriving
them and their descendants of civil and political rights. 89 In addition,
pursuant to an Arabization campaign, Syria evicted Kurds from villages
along the borders with Turkey and Iraq, offered Arabs incentives to resettle
there, replaced Kurdish place names with Arabic ones, and banned shop
signs in Kurmanji. 90
The Syrian uprising and civil war have transformed the Kurdish
predicament in the country, at least temporarily. The uprising effectively
began among Kurds. In January 2011, they held demonstrations in the
eastern city of Hasaka to protest their political disenfranchisement, and, as
protests spread across the country, Kurds mobilized quickly to participate. 9'

2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/iran-is-eyeing-a-strategic-partnership-with-thekurds-1.455095; Ofra Bengio, Kurdistan Reaches Toward the Sea, HA'ARETZ (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/weekend-opinions/kurdistan-reaches-toward-the-sea1.455675.
84 See LOWE, supra note 80, at 4.
85 As is the case with the Copts of Egypt, see note 25, supra, and accompanying text,
statistics pertaining to the size of the Kurdish population in Syria are imprecise and politically
contested. See id. at 2.
86 Id. at 3.
87 See Edmonds, supra note 82, at 103.
88 Id. at 104.
89 LoWE, supra note 80, at 3.
90 Id.

91 See Michael Weiss, Why Syria's Kurds will Determine the Fate of the Revolution, THE
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However, they have since moved to the margins of the conflict, apparently
encouraged by the Asad' regime's promises of fuller enfranchisement; put
off by the Arabist and Islamist orientation of the Syrian National Council (as
well as its close relationship with Turkey); and perhaps also hedging their
bets as the civil war rages on. 9 2 At the same time, and with little resistance
from a regime distracted by troubles elsewhere, they have established de
facto self-rule over a "250 mile wide swath of northern Syria ...that is the
heartland of the country's oil industry." 93 One journalist describes the
transformation as follows:
Now, red, green and yellow-banded Kurdish flags can be seen above
municipal buildings. Kurds are policing their own towns and cities.
Kurdish political parties control the distribution of food, water and
fuel, and have set up their own makeshift courts.
Kurdish
paramilitary forces are training in94 camps in northeastern Syria and
across the border in northern Iraq.
Kurdish leaders have made clear, moreover, that they regard these steps
toward autonomy as irreversible, and they have fortified ties with and
obtained assistance from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the
Kurdistan Workers's Party (PKK),
whose separatist struggle against Turkey
95
has escalated over the last year.
It is far from clear where these transformations will lead. The manifold
uncertainties created by the stalemate in the Syrian civil war have allowed
Kurds in Syria and elsewhere to exploit rivalries among governments in the
region in the pursuit of Kurdish interests, securing support from Tehran and
acquiescence from Damascus, 96 as well as a measure of restraint from
Ankara. 97 At the same time, however, central governments are not
indifferent to the possibility that growing transnational cooperation among
Kurdish parties in the region and the increasing autonomy of Kurdish areas
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in Syria and Iraq will bolster-rather than quiet-Kurds' national
ambitions. 98 What remains to be seen is whether these dynamics will yield
enhanced protection of Kurds' individual and communal rights within these
states-perhaps coupled with greater freedom of movement between themor, instead, inspire a more decisive push for Kurdish independence.
Like the cause of Coptic rights in Egypt, the character of the Kurdish
struggle therefore remains something of an open question. A key factor
distinguishing the two causes, however, is the territorial dimension of
Kurdish claims. Kurds seek more than equality as citizens of the modem
states where they reside. This desire for self-determination both informs and
complicates their pursuit of other rights. Some of these rights-to teach
Kurmanji and Kurdish history in schools, to use Kurdish place-names, to
maintain transnational relations with Kurds in other states, and to establish
autonomous local political institutions-may be pursued within the
framework of the existing territorial order. Such efforts, however, may also
be seen (by Kurds and others) as a prelude to independence, prompting
governments to resist even modest steps for fear that they will create a
slippery slope to secession, at the expense of the territorial integrity and
strategic security of existing states. These concerns are especially acute in
cases in which access to valuable resources is implicated. Conversely,
governmental repression of Kurdish nationalism may simply serve to
sharpen the Kurds' resolve to secede.
Similar dynamics complicate the status and protection of ethnic and
religious minorities elsewhere in the region. Iranian authorities have cracked
down harshly on separatists in the country's oil-rich Khuzestan province,
whose Arab majority has long faced discrimination and economic
marginalization. 99 The secession of South Sudan and the 2011 partial peace
agreement between the regime in Khartoum and Darfuri rebel groups failed
to bring an end to intercommunal conflict in the Sudan. According to
International Crisis Group, the governing National Congress Party "remains
committed to an Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese... set[ting] the stage
for continued violence that may not be containable and could lead to further
98 See Roy Gutman, Turkey Warns Asad That He Must Keep Kurds in Check, or Risk
Intervention
(July
27,
2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-NewsWires/2012/0727/Turkey-warns-Assad-that-he-must-keep-Kurds-in-check-or-riskintervention; Shwan Zulal, Splitting Iraq: How Likely is an Independent Kurdistan?, NIQASH
(July 12, 2012), http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3087.
99 Palash R. Ghosh, Ahwazis: Iran's Persecution of its Arab Minority, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(July 24, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/ahwazis-iranE2%80%99s-persecution-its-arabminority-729874.
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fragmentation of the country."' 00 In Saudi Arabia, efforts by the Shi'i
minority to end their political and economic marginalization are undermined
by Sunni fears that they seek, in collusion with Iran, to establish their own
independent state in the country's oil rich Eastern Province.10 In Israel,
moreover, the Palestinian minority has faced a resurgence of Jewish
nationalism following the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the effective demise of the
Oslo peace process, resulting in broad support for repressive and
discriminatory legislation targeting Palestinian citizens, 102 as well as for their
"transfer" from the state. 103
In all of these contexts, demands for minority rights have become
entangled with regime concerns about territorial integrity and political
subversion in ways that not only undermine the protection of rights, but also,
in the process, bolster minority opposition to the regime and the legitimacy
of revolutionary or secessionist movements. As described in the next Part,
similar cycles of conflict make political transitions especially difficult in
states where members of an ethnic or religious minority control the regime.
c. PoliticallyDominantMinorities & Survivalist Minoritarianism
Minoritarian regimes were once a common feature of the Middle East's
political landscape. As Joshua Landis points out, "[flollowing World War
II, minorities took control in every Levant state, thanks to colonial divideand-rule tactics and the fragmented national community that bedeviled the
states of the region."'' 4 Although most such regimes have since fallen, those
100 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 174: DIVISIONS IN SUDAN'S RULING

PARTY AND THE THREAT TO THE COUNTRY'S STABILITY at i (2011), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/hom-of-africa/sudan/I 74-divisions-in-sudansruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx.
101 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 70, at 5.
102For a review of such legislation, see Update: Anti-Democratic Legislation Initiatives,
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remaining present distinct challenges to the establishment of a legal order
that reconciles democracy with minority protection. As described below,
fears that political change will deprive members of a politically dominant
minority of power and entitlements--or, worse, will lead to violent reprisals
or even genocide-create a potent incentive (and useful pretext) for resisting
even modest reforms. Assurances that constitutional safeguards will protect
the minority are viewed skeptically, particularly in circumstances where the
regime can point to the minority's past persecution or the abuse of kin
groups in neighboring states. The regime's mobilization of fear in defense
of repressive policies creates, in turn, a self-fulfilling prophecy,
superimposing a narrative of ethnic or religious conflict upon the struggle for
political change and transforming a minority problem into a majority
problem.
This dynamic is vividly illustrated by the continuing crisis in Syria. The
Asad family, which has held the reins of power in Damascus since 1970,
comes from Syria's Alawi community. 10 5 During Ottoman rule, the
country's Alawis lived in relative poverty, isolated in the mountains above
the port of Latakia and marginalized by Sunni elites, who considered them
nonbelievers or "exaggerators."'' 0 6 Though Arabic-speaking, the Alawis
initially distanced themselves from the cause of Arab nationalism, which in
the 1920s had taken on "a Sunni tincture" and assimilationist bent that
Alawis "construed as an attempt to subordinate the non-Sunni
communities."'0 7 Aligning themselves instead with France, which governed
Syria as mandatory power during the interwar years, the Alawis managed to
achieve a degree of autonomy from Damascus that many were loath to
surrender when the country was formally unified in 1936.'08 Indeed, a
delegation of Alawi notables (including the grandfather of President Bashar
al-Asad) sent a memorandum to France's Prime Minister, Leon Blum,
affirming their loyalty to France and their refusal to be "annexed to Muslim
Syria," adding, "as to the presence of a parliament and a constitutional
archives/syrian-uprising-20 11 -why-asad-regime-likely-survive-2013.
105 The Alawi'a are adherents of an offshoot of Shi'ism that has been described as "a folk
religion that absorbed many of the spiritual and intellectual currents of late antiquity and early
Islam, packaged into a body of teachings that placed its followers beyond the boundaries of
orthodoxy." Malise Ruthven, Storm Over Syria, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 9, 2011), available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/201 f/jun/09/storm-over-syria/?page=l.
106 Id.
107 ltamar Rabinovich, The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-45, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HIST. 693, 699 (1979).

'o'Id. at 703-04; Ruthven, supra note 105.
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government, that does not represent individual freedom. This parliamentary
rule is no more than false appearances without any value. hn truth, it covers
up a regime dominated by religious fanaticism against the minorties." 109
Following Syria's independence, many Alawis gravitated toward the
Ba'ath Party's anti-sectarian vision of Arab nationalism and to the
opportunities for social advancement offered by enlistment in the military,
eventually dominating both institutions. 0 The Asad family consolidated its
hold on power over time, "marshal[ing] in-laws, cousins and coreligionists
into the upper ranks of the security forces," as well as the higher ranks of
important ministries.1"'1 Even now, most Alawi families can point to at least
one member in the security forces and several others employed by civilian
ministries. 112 As Joshua Landis observes, "[d]espite the rhetoric of Arab
nationalism, the Asads were keenly aware that only the traditional loyalties
of family, clan and sect could cement their rule. Inessence, they upheld the
notion that it takes a village to rule Syria, a formula that successfully brought
an end to political instability." 1 13 The regime applied a similar formula to its
relations with other groups, encouraging clan, tribal, and religious leaders
across the country to "build constituencies and to mediate these
constituencies' relations with the state apparatus," developing a web of
relationships that has enabled the regime to respond to crises, but also
"undermined the development of associational life on a national basis."1 14
The minoritarian character of the regime in Damascus has had a
profound effect on efforts to reform or replace it. "Khudr," the pseudonym
for a reformist Alawi engineer, neatly captured the nature of the challenge in
a 2005 blogpost. 115 "Khudr" pointed out that support for the Asad regime

109 Ruthven, supra note 105. In the same year, it should be added, a separate group of
Alawi religious and political leaders who supported the Alawi areas's union with the rest of
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had diminished among many Alawis as a result of the country's economic
decline, the regime's corruption, and the increasing economic and political
marginalization of poor segments of the community. 116 He observed,
however, that members of the sect remained reluctant to support regime
change, complaining that "[n]ot a single Syrian intellectual, political leader,
or plain good-will writer, has ever dealt with the following fundamental
question: [w]hat exactly are your plans for the Alawis after we give up
power?"' 1 7 In particular, "Khudr" inquired about the fate of tens of
thousands of Alawis employed by the government and military and security
services, of land reforms that had benefited Alawi peasants, and of
development 18projects in coastal areas where the community is
concentrated. 1

The Syrian civil war has raised the stakes of regime change even
further, both for Alawis and for the regime's opponents. At the beginning of
the uprising, the protest movement was quick to emphasize its rejection of
sectarianism, articulating its objectives in terms of universal political rights
and civil liberties, rather than ethnic or religious identity. 1 9 The regime, on
the other hand, alleged that the protests were the product of "sectarian
manipulation by foreign actors[,] casting the protestors as infiltrators,
saboteurs, or armed gangs, and associating them with plots and conspiracies
by a host of named and unnamed enemies."' 120 The regime's deployment of
Alawi officers and militias in its brutal response to the uprising further
entrenched this narrative of sectarian conflict:
Playing upon terrors that Alawites may again be persecuted as
heretics as they often were in the past, the Asad regime has
encouraged a sort of Masada complex, goading loyalists toward
extreme violence as if the sole alternative were annihilation. The
effect of this, perhaps intended,
12 has been to implicate Alawites as a
whole in the regime's crimes. 1
As a result, "a majority of Alawi officials, security officers and ordinary
citizens ...have become convinced that their fate is either to kill or be

116
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119 See Ismail, supra note 114, at 542.
120

id.
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killed."' 22 Although International Crisis Group points out that "the regime
has been infinitely more sectarian than the protest movement," it warns that
"reality gradually has been catching up with fiction," 123 an assessment
shared by the United Nations' special adviser on the prevention of
genocide. 24 For many Alawis, democratization consequently has come to
mean not only a return to the political, social and economic subordination
they previously suffered under Sunni-led governments in Damascus and
Istanbul, but a threat to their very survival.
What makes the situation in Syria even more explosive is that it
encapsulates all three kinds of "minority problems" described above. The
Asad regime has played on fears of Islamist majoritarianism as a means of
marshaling support from Alawis, Christians, and secularists in Syria, 25 and
it has portrayed opponents to its rule as subversives beholden to foreign
interests, including Western powers, Sunni regimes, transnational jihadi
Conversely, members of the Syrian
movements, and even Israel. 126
opposition claim that the regime's supporters have begun laying the
groundwork for the establishment of an independent Alawi state in the event
that the regime falls, 12 compounding resentment about Alawi support for
the regime with concerns that they are prepared to undermine the country's
territorial integrity. They also point to the regime's alliance with Iran and
Hizbollah as evidence of a transnational Shi'i axis to deprive Syria's Sunnis
of their rights.
Similar dynamics complicate efforts to achieve democratic change in
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other states in the region. In Bahrain, where the Sunni Khalifa monarchy
governs a majority-Shi'a population, the regime has long exploited sectarian
divisions as a means of stymieing challenges to its authority.128 Although
the country's protest movement has undertaken to emphasize the nonsectarian character of its demands for political reform and counts both Shi'a
and Sunnis among its supporters, 129 the government has worked to recast "a
popular pro-democracy movement against an authoritarian regime [as] one
of a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shia," and to depict protestors as
agents of Iran. 130 As a result, many Bahraini Sunnis have become convinced
that republican government "can only mean an Iranian-style theocratic
system." t31
The specter of majoritarianism is invoked in similar ways in Israeli
political discourse. Israel established a Jewish majority within the Green
Line by blocking the return of Palestinian refugees who fled or were
expelled from their homes in 1948 and encouraging the immigration of
Jews. 132 However, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
since 1967 and the failure of the Oslo process to produce a negotiated twostate solution have transformed "the Jewish state" '1 33 into a de facto
minoritarian regime, Jews having ceased recently to be a majority in the
territory controlled by the Israeli government. 134 Perceptions of Palestinians
as a threat-not only to Israel's "right to exist as a sovereign Jewish
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130 Joost Hiltermann, Bahrain:A New Sectarian Conflict?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (May 8,
2012,
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ENDOWMENT
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
(Apr.
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2011),
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State, 8 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 475, 484-85 (2002).

133 The legitimacy of characterizing Israel as a (or the) "Jewish state" is hotly contested.
For competing perspectives, see Steven Menashi, Ethnonationalismand Liberal Democracy,
32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 57 (2010), and Nadim N. Rouhana & Nimer Sultany, Redrawing the
Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony, 33 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 7-9 (2003).
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state,"' 35 but also to the security (and even survival) of its Jewish
citizens 136-are offered as justifications for opposition to the
enfranchisement of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
pursuant to a one-state solution. They are also cited in support of proposals
to disenfranchise Palestinian citizens of Israel 137 and for the Israeli
government's
continuing refusal even to contemplate Palestinian refugee
38
1
return.
To be sure, Syria, Bahrain, and Israel differ from one another in
significant ways. However, apprehensions in all three states about the
security consequences of majority rule have provided the communities in
power with rationales--or pretexts-for refusing to relinquish or share
control over the machinery of state.
The three minority problems described above clearly overlap in some
respects: in some contexts, religious minorities are considered (and treated
like) nationalist minorities, and politically dominant minorities have tended
themselves to be religious minorities, nationalist minorities, or both. This
typology, moreover, is neither intended to capture the breadth of sources of
intercommunal conflict in the Middle East nor to suggest that heterogeneity
within states is necessarily a source of disharmony. It is meant, however, to
illuminate the need for-and the challenges facing-the clarification and
protection of minority rights in states of the Middle East. The next Part
considers the international legal context for such an effort.

II.

THE STATUS AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

States have attempted to craft multilateral solutions to the problem of
intercommunal conflict since the dawn of the Westphalian order. Indeed, the
Peace of Westphalia was itself a response to the internecine religious wars
135 Shimon Peres, Israelis, PalestiniansNeed Two States, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/09/AR2009020902098.html.
136 See Dahlia Scheindlin, Anticipating September, JERUSALEM REP. (July 3, 2011),

http://www.jpost.com/JerusalemReport/lsrael/Article.aspx?id=227553 (reporting that 40% of
Israelis believe Palestinians seek to "destroy much of the Jewish population").
137 See Blecher, supra note 103, at 744; Rouhana & Sultany, supra note 133, at 7-13.
138 Ehud Barak & Benny Morris, Camp David and After - Continued, N. Y. REV. BOOKS
(June 27, 2002), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/un/27/campdavid-and-aftercontinued/?pagination=false; see also Sharon: Palestinian 'Right of Return off
the Table, JERUSALEM POST (May 7, 2003) (quoting Ariel Sharon as saying "The right of
return is a recipe for the destruction of Israel").
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that rent Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.'1 39 The treaties that
comprised it not only affirmed and broadened the right of princes to
determine the religion of inhabitants of the territories they ruled,
extinguishing the Holy Roman Emperor's authority over the matter, 140 they
also established the right of Christian minorities in those realms to religious
toleration, subject to some limitations and exceptions.' 4' Although the
treaties are often credited with inaugurating the modem system of territorial
nation-states in Europe, 142 their terms were not animated by a desire to
establish a general norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
sovereign states, which would emerge only later. 143 Nor were they
conceived to sanctify religious liberty as an individual right.' 44 The parties'
paramount concern was, instead, the need to build a stable international
order in the wake of the most devastating wars Europe had known. '4' By
extending to one another a degree of religious autonomy and exchanging
guarantees that at least Christian minorities within them would not face
persecution, Europe's powers undertook to eliminate the cause of-or
pretext for--destabilizing interventions.
Neither the map drawn in Westphalia nor the system of political
relations that has come to bear its name succeeded in preventing a
resurgence of intercommunal and international conflict in Europe. Indeed,
the three multilateral efforts that have done most to define the rights of
minorities in modern, heterogeneous states all followed cataclysmic wars.
The League of Nations' minorities protection system was established after

139 See MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE

4950 (James Crawford & David Johnston eds., 1997).
140 The principle of cuius region, eius religio ("Whose the region is, his religion.") was

first established in the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, id. at 46-47, but was reaffirmed and
extended to Calvinist rulers in the Treaty of MiInster, id. at 51-52.
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55 INT'LORG. 251,261 (2001).
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hundred years, in the late 18th century writings of Wolff and Vattel. See Stephen D. Krasner,
141
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Pervasive, Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 651,
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144 See Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in
International Law Reconsidered, 23 J. L. & RELIGION 455, 501-02 (2007). The treaties,
moreover, upheld the right to religious practice of only specified religious communities. See
EVANS, supranote 139, at 50-51.
145 Danchin, supra note 144, at 504 (noting that "treaty practice following Westphalia was
motivated . . . by the desire to eliminate possible causes of conflict").
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World War I. The United Nations human rights system was built in the
wake of World War II. And the Balkan conflicts that erupted after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia were the impetus for minority rights initiatives in
Europe and at the global level. Like Westphalia, each of these lawmaking
episodes reflected recognition of the threat posed by intercommunal conflict
within states to the stability of the international order. But while all three
embraced the protection of human rights as a vehicle for preventing such
conflict, they differed with respect to the relative emphasis they placed on
individual versus group rights and the sanctity they attached to the
sovereignty of states.
a. The League of Nations Minority ProtectionSystem
Communal identity-national, religious, and ethnic (or "racial")-was a
leitmotif of the international conferences that brought an end to the First
World War and established the League of Nations. 146 The principle of selfdetermination, championed by President Wilson as the normative foundation
for a new international order, ultimately played a relatively small role in the
delimitation of borders in central and eastern Europe. 147 It did, however,
find expression in an enhanced system of minority protection in newly
created states. 148 That system was enacted through the inclusion of minority
protection clauses in peace treaties between the Allied Powers and some of
the defeated states and through the requirement that newly created states
before the
enter into treaties with the Allied Powers, or make declarations
49
League of Nations, committing to minority protections. 1
Notably, the system's normative framework included commitments to
safeguard not only the individual rights of members of minorities, but also
certain communal rights:
The obligations assumed by these states fell roughly into four
categories. The first, embracing citizenship rights, defined the
conditions under which citizenship could be acquired. In the second
and third categories were included rights of life, liberty, and religious
freedom of general applicability to all inhabitants; and civil and

146
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148
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political rights for all nationals, including equality before the law and
equal access to civil service, business, and profession as well as the
use of their own language in religion, press, and assembly. Finally,
certain special rights, designed to protect their cultural identity, were
guaranteed to all nationals belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic
minorities. These rights included the free enjoyment of equal
treatment and security in law and in fact with other nationals; the
receipt of primary school education in their own language; the right
to establish under their own control charitable, educational, social,
and religious institutions; and the right to share equitably in the
enjoyment and application of public funds allocated for educational,
religious, or charitable purposes. In addition, certain of the treaties
contained special provisions for the protection of particular minority
groups, such as the Jews in Poland, the Mussulmans [sic] in
Yugoslavia, the Saxons and Czecklers
in Rumania, the Ruthenians in
150
Czechoslovakia, and certain others.
As Yoram Dinstein points out, this system was premised on the idea that
"each minority has concurrently the right to full equality with the majority
and to preservation of its separate identity"-a right, in other words, "not to
assimilate itself to the majority, unless it wishes to do so." 15' The limits of
the latter right, however, were hotly contested from the outset as some states
regarded the recognition of robust communal rights as both
a challenge to
152
their sovereignty and a source of intercommunal tension.
b. The United Nations Human Rights System
Hostility to the idea of communal rights for minorities prevailed over
the international lawmaking enterprise that followed World War II.
Although the idea continued to be championed in some quarters,' 5 3 the
parties that forged the United Nations system regarded communal rights as
divisive-"a method within states of preserving a 'fifth column' that would
subvert internal Stability. ' ' 1 4 They were also considered an idiosyncratically
European approach to managing pluralism that was inappropriate for

150 Mary Gardiner Jones, National Minorities: A Case Study in InternationalProtection, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 599, 606-07 (1949).

151 Dinstein, supra note 149, at 116.
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extension to Africa155 or the Americas.1 6 The concept of communal rights
was not abandoned entirely: the UN Charter pays lips service to the
"principle of self-determination of peoples", 157 and the Genocide Convention
is premised at least implicitly on the right of groups to physical survival. 158
However, the system inaugurated in San Francisco privileged the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states over the self-determination of
peoples as a normative framework for the maintenance of international
peace.
To be sure, the United Nations' human rights system has come to
represent a challenge to absolutist conceptions of state sovereignty.
However, its foundational legal instruments address the rights of ethnic and
religious minorities almost exclusively through equality and antidiscrimination norms vested in individuals rather than groups. 5 9 The
omission of communal rights from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) was not accidental: after considerable debate, the Human
Rights Commission concluded that the Declaration's individual rights
protections made specific protections for minorities superfluous. 6 ° The
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rights."); id. art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
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("All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection
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Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."); see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR] ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
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id. art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
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origin, property, birth or other status.").
160 Eide, supra note 148, at 37-39.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was
adopted in 1966, goes further toward recognizing minority rights,
reaffirming in Article 1 the right of all peoples to self-determination

161

and

providing in Article 27 that "[p]ersons belonging to ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion or to use their own language." 162 However, the Human
Rights Committee has been reluctant to elaborate on the implications of the
principle of self-determination outside of the colonial context, citing
concerns about the territorial integrity of states,1 63 and the extent to which
64
Article 27 protects group rights has been a point of some contention.,
Moreover, while states concluded a human rights treaty focused on the
elimination of discrimination in 1965,165 efforts within the UN SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to
66
develop a comparable treaty codifying the rights of minorities foundered.1
According to one influential study, governments were skeptical about the
utility of articulating uniform norms for application to the widely varying
contexts in which minority rights were an issue and feared that such an
enterprise would both provide a pretext for external intervention and threaten
167
states' internal unity and stability.
Until recently, regional human rights systems largely hewed to this
approach. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms accords protection primarily to individual rights,
omitting even the limited references to group rights contained in the ICCPR
and offering standing only to individuals.168 Similarly, the Inter-American
161 ICCPR, supra note 159, at art. 1.
162 Id. art. 27.
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human rights system was crafted with an explicit-and deliberate-focus on
individual rights, evincing "a preference for individual rights protection
based on egalitarian norms," concern about "the potential destabilizing
effects of minority protection regimes," and the conviction, particularly
among Latin American states, that "the major distinct groups in the
Americas were immigrants who were expected to assimilate into national
society."

169

Indeed, while the American Convention draws heavily upon the

ICCPR, a provision comparable to Article 27 of the International Covenant
is "conspicuously absent." 170 The African human rights system is less
individualistic in orientation than the European and American systems: the
Banjul Charter proclaims the rights of "all peoples," inter alia, to
existence, 171 equality, 172 self-determination, 173 and "economic, social and

cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity."'' 74 Like
their American counterparts, however, African governments have both
challenged the relevance of minority protection to circumstances in African
states and expressed concern that regimes focused on the group rights of
minorities would
foster factionalism that undermined the nation-building
75
enterprise. 1

c. Recent Developments in InternationalMinority ProtectionLaw
The internecine ethnic conflict that attended the dissolution of
Yugoslavia prompted some reconsideration of the adequacy of an individual
rights approach to protecting minorities. 76 At the global level, the UN
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Minorities in
1992. 17 In addition to reaffirming a range of individual rights possessed by
members of minority groups, the Declaration recognizes the obligation of
169
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170
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171
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Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18,
1992) [hereinafter U.N. Minorities Declaration].
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states to "protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious
and linguistic identity of minorities"'' 78 and encourages states, "where
appropriate," to "take measures in the field of education, in order to
encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the
minorities existing within their territory."' 179 Though non-binding and
relatively limited in scope, the Declaration's provisions depart from the
approach taken in the UDHR and ICCPR in two respects. First, they reflect
an explicit (if contingent) embrace of pluralism within states, encouraging
them not only to tolerate but also to cultivate sub-national communal
identity. 80 Second, they articulate a duty to protect the existence and
identity "of minorities", rather than "of persons belonging to minorities,"
implying that these rights are vested in groups as well as individuals. 18'
Over the last two decades, European regional institutions have further
elaborated these norms. Members of the Conference (now Organization) for
Security and Cooperation in Europe defined standards pertaining to minority
issues in the 1990 Copenhagen Document,' 82 even before Yugoslavia
disintegrated into war.' 8 3 Then, in 1994, the Council of Europe adopted the
Framework Convention on National Minorities, which was subsequently
ratified by most of the Council's members.' 84 The Convention sets out an
array of principles for ensuring "the effective protection of national
minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those
minorities" that is substantially coextensive with the Copenhagen

178
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180 Wippman, supra note 153, at 606-07.
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the Conference on Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305 [hereinafter
Copenhagen Document]. Although the Copenhagen Document is not a treaty, describing it as
soft law may understate its influence. See Steven R. Ratner, Does InternationalLaw Matter
in PreventingEthnic Conflict, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591, 608-15 (2000).
183 The Balkan wars did, however, impel them to establish the Office of the High
Commissioner for National Minorities, which promotes adherence to minority protection
standards with a view toward preventing future conflict. See Wright, supra note 181 at 20001.
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Document's standards. Although its mechanisms for implementing these
principles "are weak even by the standards of international human rights
treaties,"1 85 the Framework Convention offers the most thorough articulation
of norms pertaining to minority protection in international law today.
A number of the Convention's substantive features are of particular
relevance to the development of norms that could guide the resolution and
First, the
prevention of intercommunal conflict in the Middle East.
Convention makes clear that the principles for minority protection it
articulates are embedded within a broader political and institutional
commitment to democracy and the rule of law.' 86 Unlike the Copenhagen
Document, which provides that "the questions relating to national minorities
can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based
on the rule of law," '187 the Framework Convention does not state that
effective minority protection is dependent upon the establishment of
democratic institutions. That presumption, however,88 is reflected in the kinds
1
of civil and political rights the Convention affirms.
Second, the Convention nowhere defines its object, "national
minorities." Its Explanatory Report states obliquely: "[i]t was decided to
adopt a pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at this stage, it is
impossible to arrive at a definition capable of mustering general support of
all Council of Europe member States."' 189 According to Hans-Joachim
Heintze, the key points of dispute that prevented agreement on a definition
were "the minimum size of the minority group and the need for a subjective
feeling of solidarity," as well as the reluctance of some states (France and
Turkey in particular) to recognize the concept of minorities at all, on the
grounds that the concept is at odds with the state's national ethos or could
pose a threat to its territorial integrity. 190 The Convention's omission of a

153, at 612-13.
186 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. (referring to minority protection as
185 Wippman, supra note
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188 For example, the Convention commits Parties to ensure respect for "freedom of
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought,"
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definition of the term national minority has allowed states to determine,
through declarations and practice, to which kinds of groups the label applies,
leading to some controversy about states' decisions to include or exclude
particular groups. 9'
Third, the Convention not only rejects forcible assimilation as a strategy
for responding to diversity,' 92 but also encourages affirmative measures to
promote the development of sub-national communal identity. 193 In this
respect, it resurrects the spirit of the League of Nations' minority protection
system, 194 treating pluralism as a source of strength rather than instability. 195
In the same vein, the Convention goes beyond prohibiting discrimination to
advocating the achievement of equality through affirmative measures that
accommodate the "specific conditions" of minority group members. 196 It
stops short, however, of recognizing that national minorities possess
communal rights as such. As Heintze observes, the Convention "follows the
universally recognized individualistic human rights approach typical of all
instruments dealing with minority issues" insofar as it "signals that the
individual per se, and not the minority group, is considered to be the rights
holder. '197 Instead, the Convention adopts an expansive conception of
freedom of association that includes commitments both to individual agency
and to the development of communal institutions. On the one hand, a

NATIONAL MINORITIES,
'9' Id. at 111-18.
192 See Framework

supra note 148, at 82-83.

Convention, supra note 9, at art. 5,

2 ("Without prejudice to measures

taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or
practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will
and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation.").
193 See id. pmbl ("[c]onsidering that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not
only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a
national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve
and develop this identity"); id. art. 11 (obliging Parties "to endeavor ...where appropriate" to
display place names in minority languages in areas inhabited by them in large numbers); id.
art. 12 (obliging parties "where appropriate" to "foster knowledge of the culture, history,
language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority"); id. art. 14 (obliging
Parties "to endeavor to ensure" that minority groups have opportunity to receive instruction in
their language).
194 Wippman, supra note 153, at 606-07.
195 Framework Convention, supra note 9, pmbl ("Considering that the creation of a climate
of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor,
not of division, but of enrichment for each society.").
196 Id. at art. 4(2).
197 Heintze, supra note 190, at 86.
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person's embrace of minority identity is treated as a matter of free choice,
rather than one to be dictated by the state or the community. 198 On the other
hand, the members of minority groups are to be given latitude to develop
their own religious,199 educational, 200 and media 20 ' institutions and contacts,

both within states and transnationally. 2 2 In these respects, as Heintze points
out, the Convention "recognizes that persons belonging to national
minorities cannot avail themselves of the rights" it sets out "without the
group," clearly implying that
participation of others belonging to the 20same
3
dimension.,
collective
"a
have
the rights
Finally, and no less importantly, the Framework Convention addresses
minority protection as part of a package of reciprocal obligations. It not only
imposes duties on states, but also binds minorities to respect "national
legislation and the rights of others" 204 and to refrain from challenging the
"sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence of
States. 2 0 5 Thus, the Convention makes clear that it is intended to operate
squarely within the framework of state sovereignty, not to present a
challenge to it. That disposition is also reflected in the Convention's
approach to enforcement: the Convention is explicitly non-self-executing, its
"through national legislation and appropriate
principles to be implemented
20 6
governmental policies.

The Framework Convention therefore represents an effort to strike a
balance between the two approaches to minority protection embraced by the
international community over the course of last century. Although it offers a
more thorough elaboration of the rights of minority group members than
other global and regional human rights instruments, it stops short of
explicitly recognizing the concept of communal rights, and it goes a
considerable distance toward preserving states' sovereign prerogatives to
craft their own strategies for managing diversity within their borders. The
next Part considers whether the states of the Middle East should follow
Europe's example by undertaking to define regional norms pertaining to the

198 Framework Convention, supra note 9, at art. 3, 1.
199

id. at art. 8.

200 Id. at art. 13,

1.

20' Id. at art. 9, 2.
202 Id. at art. 17, 1.
203 Heintze, supra note 190, at 86.
204

Framework Convention, supra note 9, at art. 20.

205 Id. at art. 21.
206 Id. pmbl.
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status and protection of minorities.
II.

DEFINING REGIONAL STANDARDS FOR MINORITY
PROTECTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Intercommunal conflict in the Middle East is a transnational and regionwide phenomenon. As described in Part I, ethnic and religious communities
are spread across national boundaries, their activities and treatment in one
state often eliciting the concern and sometimes the intervention of kin groups
or adversaries in other states. Transnational social movements, such as Arab
nationalism, revolutionary and political Islam, and democratization, have
influenced identity formation and geopolitical relations across the region,
producing both transformative alliances and violent rivalries. Moreover,
some of the consequences of intercommunal conflict within states, like
refugee flows and economic disruptions, are felt well outside their borders.
In view of these transnational dimensions, intrastate processes, such as
constitutional reform and institutional development, can offer only partial
solutions to intercommunal conflict in the region. Because such conflict
tends to arise from-and manifest itself in-the deprivation of rights,
discourse about how those rights should be defined and safeguarded is a
natural starting point for regional action. But is a new human rights treaty
really the solution to intercommunal conflict in the Middle East? To what
extent is there consensus about the content of norms pertaining to the status
and treatment of minorities? Which normative gaps need filling? Which
normative conflicts need resolution?
And to what extent could an
agreement, or an effort to reach one, help change the situation on the ground
in the states of the region? As a step toward answering these questions, this
Part offers a few observations regarding the promise and limits of rights as a
framework for preventing and responding to intercommunal conflict in the
Middle East.
a. Normative Consensus and Conflict
An effort to develop regional norms addressing the status and protection
of minorities would not write on a blank slate. Most of the states in the
Middle East are already parties to a number of international human rights
instruments: all of them have acceded to the Genocide Convention; all
except Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates are parties
to the ICCPR (though only Algeria has acceded to the ICCPR Special
Protocol); and all are parties to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (though, notably, Saudi
Arabia has entered a reservation that it will implement only the provisions
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that "do not conflict with the precepts of the Islamic Shariah").2 °7 Thus, the
governments of the region have already committed to certain basic
propositions: minority groups have a right to physical existence; their
members should both be protected from discrimination; and they should be
allowed to use their languages, practice their religions, and "enjoy" their
cultures.2 °8
In addition, Islamic and Arab multilateral institutions have developed
human rights instruments of their own that offer an additional reference
point for discourse about the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. The
Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation) adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam in
1990 for presentation to the Preparatory Committee of the UN World
Conference on Human Rights.2 0 9 In its first article, the Cairo Declaration
affirms that "[a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic
obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of
race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status
or other considerations," though it adds that "[t]he true religion is the
guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity. 21 °
Similarly, while the Declaration also provides that "[e]veryone shall have the
right to live in security for himself, his religion, ' ' 2 11 it states that "Islam is the
religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of
compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert
him to another religion or to atheism., 21 2 It makes clear, moreover, that
"[a]ll the rights and
freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the
' 213
Islamic Shari'ah.

The Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994,
though the initial version of the Charter was not ratified by any member
state. As part of an effort to harmonize the Charter with international human
rights standards, a revised version was adopted at the League's Summit of
207 Listings of the parties to international human rights treaties, and reservations to them,
may be found here: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&Iang-en.
208 See notes 158-162, supra, and accompanying text.
209 See Contribution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, World Conference on
Human Rights, Preparatory Committee, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add. 18
(Aug.
5,
1990)
(hereinafter
Cairo
Declaration),
available
at
http://wwwl .umn.edulhumanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html.
210

Id.at art 1.

211

Id. at art. 18.
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 24.

212
213
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Heads of State in 2004,214 and it entered into force in 2008.215 The revised
version of the Charter includes relatively broad anti-discrimination
provisions, guaranteeing the protection of individual rights "without
distinction on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religious belief,
opinion, thought, national or social origin, wealth, birth or physical or
mental disability," and obliging parties to "take the requisite measures to
guarantee effective equality in the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms
enshrined in the... Charter in order to ensure protection against all forms of
discrimination."'2 16 Echoing Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Charter also
prohibits parties from denying "[p]ersons belonging to minorities . . . the
right to enjoy their own culture, to use their own language and to practice
their own religion." 217 In addition, like the African Banjul Charter, the Arab
Charter recognizes a number of "people's" rights, including the "right of
self-determination and to control over their natural wealth and resources, and
the right to freely choose their political system and to freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.' 2 18 However, in view of the
Charter's declaration in the same article that "[a]ll peoples have the right to
national sovereignty and teritorial integrity,, 21 9 it seems unlikely that these
provisions were intended to apply to sub-national groups.
When read in light of the dynamics described in Part I of this Article,
these instruments reflect the need both for further development of norms
pertaining to the status and protection of minorities in the region and for a

214 Mervat Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: Step Forward?, 5

HUM. RTS. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (2005).
215 Mervat Rishmawi, The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States:
An Update, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 169, 169 (2010). By October 2009, ten states had ratified
the Charter: Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United
Arab Emirates and Yemen. Id. at 172.
216 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, art. 3, reprinted
in 12 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005), entered intoforce March 15, 2008 (hereinafter Arab
Charter). See also id. at art. 4 (prohibiting derogations from the Charter that discriminate
"solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin"); id. at art. II
("All persons are equal before the law and have the right to enjoy its protection without
discrimination.").
217 Arab Charter, supra note 216, at art. 25. This provision differs from Article 27 of the

ICCPR in two ways: first, it excludes the fight of minority group members "to profess" their
religion, potentially limiting the right of religious minorities to proselytize; and, second, it
includes a caveat that "[t]he exercise of these rights shall be governed by law," potentially
offering states a basis for circumscribing the free exercise of these minority rights.
218 Id. at art. 2,
219 Id. at art. 2,

1.
2.
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concerted attempt to harmonize existing local norms with one another and
The need for
with established international human rights standards.
of religious
to
the
rights
with
respect
greatest
harmonization is perhaps
minorities. The Cairo Declaration's characterization of all of the rights it
affirms as "subject to the Islamic Shariah," an idea echoed in many of the
region's constitutions,2 2 ° obviously raises the question of what constraints
Islamic law places on the exercise of minority rights. Indeed, some of the
issues that have been sources of concern among religious minorities-such
as the freedom to build churches and shrines, the ability of non-Muslims to
assume leadership positions within an "Islamic" state, the right of nonMuslims to proselytize, and the right of Muslims to convert from Islam to
another religion-are points about which there are differences not just
between Islamic law and international human rights instruments, but also
The diversity of approaches
within the Islamic legal tradition. 22
encompassed by the shari'acreates opportunities for advocacy, negotiation,
and progressive development of rights.222 However, not all questions may
be considered negotiable: Islamic law has been hostile, for example, to
protecting the religious rights of adherents of monotheist faiths that
Flexibility, moreover, may undermine
developed after Islam. 23
predictability, offering religious minorities little assurance that an Islamist
government will expand rather than contract their legal rights. While the
region's history offers no shortage of models for self-governance by
minority communities, it is also rich in examples of intolerance for
heterodoxy and individual agency.
The under-development of norms also requires attention. The Cairo

220

See, e.g., Article 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of

Iraq], 2005 ("Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of
legislation.... No law may be enacted which violates the established provisions of Islam.");
CONSTITUTION

OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, 26 Feb. 2012, art. 3, available at

www.voltairenet.org/articlel73033.html

("Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of

legislation."); CONSTITUTION ARAB REPUBLIC EGYPT, art. 4 ("Principles of Islamic Sharia are
the principal source of legislation."), available at http://muftah.org/english-translation-of-

egypts-new-draft-constitution/.
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See Gudrun Kramer et al., Minorities in Muslim Societies, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD.

ONLINE,

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0536 (last visited Feb. 13,
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222 See Nazila Ghanea, Human Rights of Religious Minorities and of Women in the Middle
East, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 705, 724 (2004) (noting that feminists have effectively employed

strategy of highlighting variations in cultural practices among Muslims as means of
distinguishing between cultural and religious practice).
223 See Kramer et al., supra note 221.
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Declaration and the Arab Charter both articulate broad guarantees against
discrimination,224 but they stop short of offering a vision regarding either the
value or the management of diversity within states. In contrast to the
Council of Europe's Framework Convention, they neither take a position
against assimilation nor commit to proactive measures for safeguarding
minority identity. Instead, like most other human rights instruments of a
general character, they are silent with respect to issues like education in
minority history, religion, language, and other aspects of culture, the use of
place-names and signage in minority languages, and the licensing of media
institutions to minority groups and in their languages. In addition, although
the Arab Charter commits parties to take "the requisite measures to
guarantee effective equality, ' 225 the extent to which such equality is
envisaged only for individuals or also for groups is left unaddressed. As
described in Part I, these kinds of issues are likely to be of particular
importance to religious and nationalist minorities, many of whom seek to
preserve their identity and a measure of autonomy in the states where they
reside, and to politically dominant minorities, who justify their
unwillingness to relinquish power by invoking fears of majoritarian tyranny.
b. The Promise and Limits of Rights
Building consensus in a region of such diversity regarding issues of
such complexity will take time and leadership. Notwithstanding the
imperatives presented by the burgeoning intercommunal tensions in the
region, an attempt to develop a detailed minority rights treaty for the Middle
East seems neither feasible nor advisable at this juncture. Even in Europe, a
region that is presently more politically homogeneous than the modern
Middle East, states were unable to commit to more than a very general
"framework" convention that gives them considerable latitude to determine
by which means to effect minority protections, even after almost two
decades of efforts to develop consensus about norms within regional
organizations.2 26 In view of the substantial variances in regime type and in
the character and pace of the transitions unfolding among Middle East states,
a treaty exercise risks producing norms that constitute the lowest common
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See notes 210, 216, supra, and accompanying text.
See note 216, supra, and accompanying text.
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For a discussion of efforts to build consensus about a minority protection framework
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within the OSCE, see generally Wright, supra note 181. For a discussion of complementary
efforts within the Council of Europe, see generallyHeintze, supra note 190, at 79-82.
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denominator 227 or that are so aspirational that they are unlikely to elicit
228
broad acceptance.
Nevertheless, a regional effort, informed by both local and global law
and practice, to define even "soft law" standards pertaining to the rights of
minorities in the region could serve a number of useful functions. At a basic
level, the discourse such an exercise could generate would be valuable in
itself, bringing to light problems that too often are allowed to fester in the
dark, testing new governments' commitment to treaty obligations entered
into by their predecessors, and providing a framework for transnational
engagement among different kinds of stakeholders-governments, nongovernmental organizations, political parties, and religious institutions-in a
context that involves lower stakes than intrastate political processes.
To the extent, moreover, that standards are defined in abstract terms,
discourse about them may also yield more moderate positions by
stakeholders than would discussion of particular problems within particular
states. Indeed, because groups that comprise the majority in some states find
themselves in the minority in others, the arbitrariness of the region's borders
may thereby be transformed from a source of conflict to a source of
empathy. The embrace of a multilateral instrument (even one lacking the
status of a treaty) could also give governing parties a more credible vehicle
for signaling their intentions than promises offered in the context of
domestic political contests. And it could provide political cover to efforts to
implement minority protections that are likely to elicit domestic opposition,
particularly if the instrument is grounded in local norms and the process
through which it is developed is perceived to have been inclusive. In
addition, the articulation of regional standards for minority protection would
conciliation, and technical
offer a normative framework for mediation,
2 29
assistance efforts by international actors.
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See Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A

Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 148-49 (2008) (arguing that attempting
to define legal rights in the absence of broad consensus regarding their specific contours
"leads to a bias towards the status quo, as well as to deliberately vague, uncontroversial, and
unimaginative expressions").
228 See Ratner, supra note 182, at 616-17 ("If drafting groups in international organizations
instead prepared harder documents in the area of minority rights, would they ever complete
them, and, if they did, what difference would they make? Most states would not become
parties to them, and many of those that did would not instantly change their attitude and start
complying.").
229 See Wippman, supra note 153, at 625-26 (noting that even soft law provides "the
starting point for the mediation and conciliation activities of international actors").
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To a substantial extent, however, the problems described in Part I arise
from disputes not about the content of norms, but about the credibility of
commitments. Arguably, many of the abuses and privations that are sources
of conflict between ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East could be
obviated through faithful adherence to human rights treaties to which most
states in the region are already adhering. The factors influencing states'
compliance with human rights obligations have been a focus of considerable
attention-and some dispute-among international law and international
relations scholars. 230 Some point to the perceived substantive fairness of the
norms, or to the perceived legitimacy of the processes through which they
are defined and promoted.2 3' Some focus on the character and strength of
domestic institutions-courts, legislatures, law enforcement organizations232
through which norms are internalized, interpreted and enforced by states.
Some examine the extent to which developing a reputation for compliance
with certain obligations enables states to advance other interests through
international cooperation.233
And some are skeptical about whether
international norms have any independent influence on state behavior at all,
arguing that compliance with them occurs only when it coincides with states'
pursuit of other military, economic, or political interests.234 Taken together,
these diverse approaches point to three challenges that constrain the
effectiveness of human rights as a framework for preventing and responding
to intercommunal conflict in the Middle East.
The first challenge is weak states. The poorly developed legal and
political institutions in most of the countries of the region provide little
assurance that commitments made at the international level will be adhered
to at the national or local level. Commitments made by regimes lacking
democratic legitimacy may be seen as the product of influence by foreign or
parochial interests, undermining buy-in at home. Moreover, regimes
concerned with their own survival may have little incentive to implement
minority protections that are opposed by a majority of the public or by
political or security elites in their countries. Indeed, such regimes may be
tempted instead to stoke intercommunal tensions as a means of bolstering
their nationalist credentials or of stymieing challenges to their authority. In

230 For a review of the literature, see Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 1942-62 (2002).
231Id. at 1958-60.
232 Id. at 1952-55.
233Id. at 1947-52.
234 Id. at 1944-47.
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addition, to the extent that governments do possess the will to implement
such protections, weak judicial and law enforcement institutions may limit
their capacity to do so, particularly at the local level. To be sure, successful
democratic transitions are likely to yield stronger institutions and, perhaps
also, more reliable adherence to human rights standards.235 However, the
outcome of the transitions in progress in the Middle East is difficult to
predict; and, in the short run, unsettling states' established modes of
operation (even dysfunctional ones) can produce competition and chaos that
bolster the threat perceptions of both governments and sub-national groups,
diminishing confidence in their commitments to one another.
The second challenge is weak nations. In states across the region,
disputes about how national identity should be defined have persisted and
perhaps even grown sharper since the Arab Spring. The capacity of human
rights standards to serve as a framework for containing and resolving such
disputes is constrained in several ways. How a nation is defined may
influence which sources of authority its members regard as legitimate,
leading to conflicts about which bodies of law should inform the definition
of rights and about who is entitled to speak on behalf of the members of
communities within a state. In addition, the definition of the nation in ways
that exclude certain groups may impel them to embrace secessionist or
irredentist ambitions, pitting their right to self-determination against the
state's right to territorial integrity. It may alternatively motivate minority
groups to secure protection of their rights through counter-majoritarian
means such as the establishment of a minoritarian regime or support for an
authoritarian regime that is friendly to their interests, in either case pitting
the rights of the minority against the rights of the majority. What makes
these kinds of disputes especially difficult to resolve is not only that they are
seen to involve a zero-sum competition for rights-the question becoming
not whether rights should be protected but whose rights should be
protected-but also that they make it difficult to distinguish legitimate fears
and grievances from pretexts for oppression or subversion.
No regional
The third challenge is weak regional institutions.
and the
as
members,
organization counts all of the states in the Middle East
League of Arab States' longstanding association with Arab nationalism
makes it less than ideally situated to win the confidence of non-Arab
communities like the Kurds (particularly in light of its reflexive past support
for repressive policies in Darfur and Western Sahara) or to elicit the
235 See id. at 1940 (discussing evidence that "ratification of human rights treaties by fully

democratic nations is associated with better human rights practices").
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participation of non-Arab states such as Israel, Iran, and Turkey. In addition,
as Michael Barnett observes, "[t]he Arab League was designed to fail as a
supranational entity, and in that sense it reflects the triumph of domestic
regimes with little interest in developing robust regional institutions. 236
Although the League contributed to the consolidation of a supranational
Arab identity,237 its decision-making procedures were conceived with a view
toward safeguarding national sovereignty, 38 and the decisions it has made
have often reflected greater concern for regime survival than regional
cooperation. 239 Accordingly, it lacks a robust framework for promoting
collective security within the region or adherence to human rights standards
among its members. Indeed, until recently, "[a]bstaining from intervention
on account of human rights violations was among the few truly consensual
principles guiding Arab League members, reflecting the common rejection
of democratic institutions by most of its leaders., 240 To be sure, the League
has recently shown new vitality, undertaking significant internal reforms,
establishing mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the Arab Charter
on Human Rights, legitimating UN Security Council action in Libya,
dispatching an observer mission to Syria, and suspending Libyan and Syrian
membership on account of human rights violations. 24 1 And as Marc Lynch
points out, it remains "the only regional organization which brings together
all of the self-identified Arab states" and, "[a]s such, it will likely remain the
privileged regional interlocutor for the United Nations and the focus of any
kind of pan-Arab diplomacy., 242 But transforming the League into a forum
in which the rights of minorities within the states of the region can be
debated, negotiated, and promoted will take considerable time and, perhaps
also, a re-imagination of its mission.
That said, none of these challenges is unique to the Middle East, and
none is an argument for indefinitely deferring an effort to build regional
consensus about norms pertaining to the status and treatment of minorities in
236 Michael N. Barnett & Etel Solingen, Designed to fail orfailure of design? The Origins
and Legacy of the Arab League, in CRAFTING COOPERATION: REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 180, 182 (Amitav Acharya & Alastair lain

Johnston eds., 2008).
237 See BARNETT, supra note 73, at 82.
238 Barnett & Solingen, supra note 236, at 192.
239 Id. at 206-07.
240 id. at 207.
241 See Marc Lynch, Making the Arab League Matter, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 8, 2012),

http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/08/making-the-arab-league-matter.
242 Id.
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the region. These challenges do point, however, to the need for careful
attention to the design of such a process, particularly with respect to the
participation not only of governments, but also of non-state actors. They
also point to the need for simultaneous efforts to strengthen domestic legal
and political institutions and to develop an inclusive framework for regional
collective security that offers states incentives for containing intercommunal
conflict, rather than contributing to its escalation.
CONCLUSION

As Peter Bartu observes, "[p]olitical transitions are a daily referendum
on identity., 243 They are, accordingly, processes during which the rights and
roles of ethnic and religious minorities in states often become a point of
contestation and conflict. As described above, the "minority problems"
facing the Middle East present an array of dilemmas that will not easily be
resolved through rote application of international human rights norms or an
attempt to codify regional norms. Nevertheless, a regional effort to build
consensus about norms pertaining to the status and protection of minorities
could facilitate much needed discourse about how to reconcile the interests
of diverse sub-national groups in the context of political change, potentially
transforming the region's minorities from democracy's collateral damage to
its collateral.
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